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IN THE 
Supreme Court 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CAr>:iTOL ELECTRIC CO·MP ANY, 
a co-partnership, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
S US_.:\_X 11. C_._~MPBELL, 
Respondent. -
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
CASE 
NO. 
7194 
This case is one in which plaintiff sought to recover 
under the mechanic's lien statute for labor, material and 
equipment installed in the building owned by the de-
fendant. The labor, material and equipment were used 
and expended in altering, repairing and remodeling the 
electrical wiring and equipment in defendant's building. 
By plaintiff's complaint it sought to recover the sum of 
Five Hundred Fifty-Two and 33/100 Dollars ($552.33) 
\rith interest at the rate of six p~ercent (6%) per annum 
from April 24, 1946 and the sum of Twenty-Five Dollars 
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($25.00) attorneys fees and costs and prayed that said 
sun1s be adjudged a lien upon the premises and land of 
the defendant and that the sarne be foreclos~ed and that it 
have execution for any deficiency. (Transcript pages 1 
to 5) 
Defendant by answer made a general denial of all the 
allegations of the complaint except the co-partnership 
of the plaintiff and the residence of the defendant in 
Salt Lake County, Utah which were admitted. (Tran-
script Page 20) 
Plaintiff sought to hold defendant responsible· and 
to have and foreclose a lien on defendant's property on 
the theory that defendant's husband, David J. Camp~ 
bell, with whom plaintiff had its dealings, was the agent 
of defendant. (Paragraph II of plaintiff's complaint. 
Transcript Page 1) 
All the witnesses heard by the court were called by 
plaintiff and all exhibits were introduced by plaintiff and 
defendant called no witnesses nor introduced any ex-
hibits. Defendant was ·called as a witness by plaintiff. At 
the conclusion of plaintiff's case, defendant rested. 
(rrranscript Page 72) 
Judge Van Cott entered his order that defendant 
have judgment against the plaintiff "no cause of ac-
tion." (Transcript Page 28) 
By findings of fact all issues were found in favor 
of the plaintiff except that of agency between defendant 
and her husband, David J. Campbell and the· court found 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that David J. l\uupbell \vas not the duly authorized 
agent of the defendant and that the plaintiff did not sell 
dte electrical supplies and furnish labor to David J. 
Can1pbell as the duly authorized agent of the defendant 
but sold said electrical supplies and furnished said labor 
to David J. Can1pbell and relied solely on the credit of 
DaYid J. Can1pbell. (Findings 3. Transcript Page 31) The 
court concluded that David J .. Campbell was not acting 
as the duly authorized agent of the def,endant and that 
defendant ,,~as entitled to a judgment of no cause of 
action. (Conclusions 1 and 2. Transcript Pages 31 and 32) 
Juclgn1ent was made and entered against the plaintiff 
no cause for action. (Transcript Page 29) 
The defendant, Susan M. Campbell, testified that on 
the 14th day of February, 1946 (which was the day the 
work was -commenced and first materials furnished, 
(Transcript Page 4. Exhibit D) ) she did not know that 
she owned the property upon which the work was p~e~r­
formed and for which materials were furnished. That 
the property was put in her name without her sanction. 
That she did not take any interest in the property. (Tran-
script Page 43) That she had nothing to do with the 
property other than signing the property hack to- the 
Inan her husband bought it from after the death of her 
husband and after the commencement of this action on 
October 31, 1947. (Transcript Page 44. Exhibit A) That 
~he discovered that she owned the property before Mr. 
Campbell died because he told her so and that he could 
not borrow the money unless he put the property in her 
narne and that \vas the only reason he put the property in 
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her na1ne. (Transcript Page 45) That Mr. Ca1npbell 
Inanaged the property, collected the rent, paid the taxes 
as far as she knew, and that she did not take any interest 
in it at all. ·That she heard her. husband say something 
about the remodeling of the property during the period, 
February 14, 1946 to April 24, 1946, but that she was 
not on the property and did riot have anything to do with 
the property. 'That Mr. Campbell ·entered into a con-
tract to sell the property to a man named Harold Brin-
ton. (Transcript Page 48) That she signed papers for 
sale of the property to 1\fr. Brinton on the 1st day of 
April, 1946, including agreement to make repairs to the 
property. (Transcript Page 49. Exhibit C) That she 
permitted Mr. Campbell to manage other properties for 
her because she could not do anything else about it. 
(Trans-cript Page 51) That she did not herself register 
the property in question with the O·P A. That she knew 
nothing about it and was never in the place in her life. 
That the only interest she had in the property was that 
it was in her name. That 1\;lr. Campbell took care of it 
and did everything he wanted to have done wi·th it. (Tran-
script Page 53) That Mr. Campbell had her authority 
to do with the property what he wanted to do. That she 
did not have a thing to do with it, did not have any in-
terest in it, did not want to have anything to do with the 
property and did not want him to put anything in her 
name be-cause she did not want to get into trouble. 
(Transcript Page 54) 
James W. Latimer, a partner in the Capitol Electric 
Company, admittedly performed the work and furnished 
1naterials at the request of David J. Campbell. Mr. Camp-
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bell told hilu he had purchased the property involved in 
thi~ action. ( Tran8eript Page ti2) That he dealt with 
1Lr. Ca1npbell all the tin1e. ( Transcriprt Page 63) That 
he charged the aeeonnt to nlr. Ca1nphell (Transcript Page 
6-±) 
~Ir. Lindsay C. :\leeks, \vho worked on the job, saw 
DaYid J. Ca1np'bell on the premises nearly every day 
and that ~lr. Crunpbell \Yas looking over the work done 
and having the work done the- way he wanted it done 
and that he did not see defendant on the premises. (Tran-
~cript Page 66) 
~Ir. Harold Burbidge Brinton on April 1, 1948 en-
tered into a contract in writing to purchase the property 
(Transcript Page 68. Exhibit C.) David J. Crunphell 
and Susan ~L Campbell, his wife, the defendant, were 
designated as the sellers and Harold Burbidge Brinton 
and Anna C. Brinton, his wife, were designated as the 
buyers. Attached to and as part of the contract was an 
agreeinent for remodeling and making certain repairs to 
the property by David J. Campbell. Both the contract 
and the agreement were signed by David J. Campbell 
and the defendant, Susan ~J. Campbell. The agreement 
provided in part: '• This agreement entered into this 1st 
day of April, 1946 by and between David J. Campbell of 
.J1urray, Utah, and Harold Burbidge Brinton of Salt Lake 
City, for certain specified repairs detailed herein to the 
buildings designated and known as 729 and 731 North 
~n<l West Street, Salt Lake City, Utah", and "Mr. Camp-
hell agrees that all of the above work will be done with 
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good Inaterials and rn a good workmanlike manner;"· 
(Exhibit C) 
The agreement (Exhibit C) made no mention of the 
electrical work, that work having been commenced on 
]j'ehruary 14, 1946 and having been completed on April, 
26, 1946, (Transcript Page 4) and was thus practically 
cornpleted on April 1, 1946 when the agreement was 
signed. (Transcript Page 70) 
1tlr. Campbell negotiated the sale of the property to 
1\Ir. Brinton for his wife, the defendant, ('Transcript 
Page 69) he having called on Mr. Brinton several days 
and weeks before, (Transcript Page 70) and Mr. Brinton 
saw Mrs. Campbell the first time about the first. of April 
\vhen they entered into the contract. ('Transcript Page 
69) 'That he gave the first payment on the contract to 
Mr. Campbell and that Mrs. Campbell was not present. 
(Transcript Page 69) 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
Appellant relies upon the following errors for a re-
versal of the judgment: 
1. The trial court erred in making that portion of 
its Findings of Fact set forth in Paragraph 3 thereof: 
"3. That the said David J. Campbell was 
not the duly authorized agent of the said defend-
ant and that the said plain tiff did not sell the said 
electrical supplies and furnish the said labor to 
D·avid J. Campbell as the duly authorized agent 
of the defendant, Susan M. Campbell, but sold 
said electrical supplies and furnished said labor 
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to David J. Can1pbell and relied solely upon the 
credit of David J. l~runpbell.'' 
2. ·The trial court erred in 1naking its Conclusion of 
Law that: 
and 
''1. '"rhat the said David J. <._;ainpbell was 
not acting as the duly authorized agent of the de-
fendant, Susan l\1. Canlp·bell", 
• • 2. That the defendant is entitled to a judg-
ment of no cause for action''. 
3. That the trial court erred In entering its 
judgment: 
"That the defendant have judgment against the 
plaintiff no cause for a·ction.'' 
STATEMENT OF POINT INVOLVED 
The evidence clearly shows that David J. Campbell 
was the agent of the defendant in contracting with plain-
tiff for the work expended and materials furnished and 
installed on the premises of the defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
The lien statute of this state is Title 52, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943. It contemplates that a lien may attach 
to an owners interest in property for labor performed 
or lllaterials furnished at the instance of an agent of the 
owner. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, Section 52-1-3, provides 
a~ follows: 
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'' 52-1-3. WHO ENTITLED-ATT·ACHES TO 
OWNER'S INTEREST- LIEN ON 
O·RES MINED. 
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons 
performing labor upon, or furnishing materials 
to be used in, the construction or alteration of, or 
·addition to, or repair of, any building, structure 
or improvement upon land; all foundry ·men and 
boiler makers; all persons performing labor or 
furnishing materials for the construction, repair-
ing of carrying on of any mill, manufactory or 
hoisting works; all persons who shall do work or 
furnish materials for the prospecting, develop-
ment, preservation or working of any mining 
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit; 
and licensed architects and engineers and artisans 
who have furnished designs, plats, plans, n1aps, 
specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, sur-
veys or superintendence, or who have rendered 
other like professional service, or bestowed labor, 
shall have· a lien upon the property upon or con-
cerning which they have rendered service, per-
formed labor or furnished materials, for the value 
of the service rendered, labor performed or ma-
terials furnished by each respectively, whether at 
the insbarnce of the ow~er o,r of amy other person 
actimg by his authority as agent, contr"actor or 
otherwise. Such liens shall attach only to such in-
terest as the owner may have in the property, but 
the interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or 
deposit, whether working under bond or other-
wise, shall for the purposes of this chapter in-
clude products mined and exeavated while the 
same remain upon the premises included within 
the lease. '' 
An agency between the owner of property and an 
agent who contracts with one who performs labor and 
furnishes 1naterial so as to create a mechanic's lien 
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ngnin~t the property, is established in the sa1ne \vay as 
any other agency nnd. the following quotation fron1 the 
ea~e of Belnap v. Condon ~3-± Utah 213, 97 Pacific 111, is 
enlightening- : 
''If, therefore, the person furnishing n1a-
terial \vhic.h is purchased for the improv,ement of 
certain property, can show that the purchaser of 
the 1naterial \Vas the agent of the real owner of 
the property, the ag~ency 1nay be established in 
such a case precisely as it may be in any other 
case but the evidence in such a case must estab-
lish agency. ' ' 
' 
...:ill action to foreclose a Inechanic's lien is by the 
\Veight of authority an equitable proceedings. Section 
3625, pages -±839 and 4840, \r olume 5, Bancroft's Code 
Practice and Remedies, citing numerous cases including 
cases from Colorado, from which state our law was 
taken together with the construction placed thereon by 
the Colorado courts. ·See page 531 Volume 3, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943. This, therefore, being an equity case 
this court should review the facts and direct findings to 
be made in accordance with the facts as interpreted by 
this court. 
Appellant contends that the facts show that David 
J. Can1pbell was agent of the defendant in dealing with 
plaintiff, in securing plaintiff-'s services and materials 
to be placed in the building of defendant. 
David eT. Campbell did not disclose that he was an 
agent for defendant and plaintiff c.harged job to David 
J. (\uupbell of who1n plaintiff made demand for pay-
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111ent and plaintiff did not know that defendant was the 
principal until after the work was completed and he at-
tempted to file a lien. This does not defeat plaintiff's 
right to hold defendant and foreclose its lien. An undis-
closed principal is bound bythe acts of her agent within 
the scope of his authority in the course of his employ-
luent. 2 Corpus Juris Section 522 on Agency, page 840: 
'' 522. UNDIS·CL·O~S:ED PRINCIP AL~(l) 
IN GENERAL. As has he~en seen in another con-
nection, an. agent who enters in to contractual re-
lations on behalf of an undisclosed principal may 
be held liable by the person with whom he deals, 
as though he himself were in fact the principal. 
The· liability of the agent is not, however, exclu-
sive, for, although the third person extended 
credit to the agent in ignorance of the fact that 
the latter was acting in a representative capacity, 
he may elect to hold the undisclosed principal 
when discovered, it being a firmly established rule 
that an undisclosed principal is bound by execu-
tory simple contracts made by the agent, and by 
acts done by the agent in relation thereto, within 
the scope of his authority and in the course of 
his employment, although the contract purports 
to he the individual contract of the agent, and al-
though the third person had previously refused 
to enter into contractual relations with the prin-
cipal. 
This rule applies only where the person 
sought to be held as undisclosed principal was not 
known to 'be a party to the transaction at the tin1e 
thereof, but it is not dependent upon the dilig~ence 
of the third person in discovering the fact of the 
concealed agency. 
Applies to written or oral contracts. The rule 
of liability of an undisclosed principal applies as 
10 
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well to a si1nple contract in writing as to an oral 
contract, although the \\'ritten contract is such 
that it is required to be in \vriting by the statute 
of frauds. 
Executed contract. But the principal is not 
liable upon a contract \Yhich has been fully exe-
cuted by the agent.'' 
In the case of Hollywood Holding and Development 
Corporation v. Os\vald, California 1931, 5 Pacific 2d 9·6·3, 
an lmdisclosed principal was held liable for the cost of 
putting in a road in front of property purchased in the 
nau1e of an agent. The court said at page 964: 
·'The rule is well established that the con-
tract of an agent who deals in his own name with-
out disclosing that of his principal, is the contract 
of the principal.'' 
A review of the evidence will show that defendant 
by her lack of management of the property, in permitting 
her husband to take and assume complete control over 
it and in exercising no control whatsoever over the prop·-
erty herself, made her husband her agent so that when 
he dealt with plaintiff the defendant became responsible 
for the debt created. 
Agency may be implied from course of dealing and 
habits of particular parties. Mechem on Agency, 2nd Edi-
tion, Section 717. It may also arise from ratification by 
a('qniescence coupled with conduct inconsistent with dis-
approval. .Thfechem on Agency, 2nd Edition, Section 471. 
Like\\Tise it may arise by failure to descent. Mechem on 
i\gen(·~T' 2nd Edition, Sections 459, 460, 461 and 462. It 
11 
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also may be shown by proof of agency on other occasions. 
Mechern on Agency, 2nd Edition, Section 260. 
As. stated in 40 Corpus Juris Mechanics' Liens, Sec-
tion 87, pages 99 and 100 the wife's property may be 
subject to a lien under a contract of improvement en-
tered into by the husband where she has "expressly o~ 
iinpliedly authorized the husband to contract as her 
agent or has held him out as her agent or has subsequent-
}~~ ratified his act.'' 
Conversely as stated in the same citation "The rule 
that the wife's property is not subject to a mechanic's 
lien under a contract with the husband is especially ap-
plicable where the contract or improvem·ent is 1nade 
against her protest even though her protest is made to 
the husband and not to the person furnishing the ma-
terial.'' 
Cited in support of this statement is the Utah case 
of ~lorrison, Merrill & Company, Respondents, v. Hardie 
L. Clark, Appellant, 20 Utah 4·32·, (1899) 59 Pacific 235 
and respondent relied on this ~ase in the trial -court and 
it was by reason of this case that the court ordered judg-
n1ent for the defendant. 
In the case of Caldwell v. Overall, Okl. ( 1940) 99 
Pacific 2d 49'6, the court sustained a 1ien against the 
wife's property and stated as follows: 
''The sole question involved is whether the 
evidence was sufficient to show that defendant's 
12 
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husband, \vho en1ployed plaintiff to do the \vork, 
\Vas defendant's agent. \J\T t• have carefully ex-
runined the record and are of the opinion that the 
agency of the husband is thereby sufficiently es-
tablished. \Vithout going into detail, it is suf-
ficient to say that the facts and circumstances 
sho,vn, as \Yell as the ad1nissions of the defendant, 
lead to the conclusion that the \York was done for 
her, and that she knew that plaintiff had been en1-
ployed for such purpos·e by the husband, and ac-
cepted his services \Vith such knowledge. 
It is settled that before a lien can be estab-
lished against real estate, the contract must be 
Inade 'vith the o'vner or his duly authorized agent, 
and that the right to the lien depends on such con-
tract. Deka D·evelop·ment Co. v. Fox, 1934, 170 
·Okl. 228, 3.9 P. 2d 143. While the husband's 
authority to act for his wife is not implied from 
the 1narital relation, nor 'from the mere fact that 
he occupied, or managed and controlled, his wife's 
property, yet in many instances the agency of the· 
hus'band is inferred from the circumstances, as 
when the wife knew that the lien claimant was 
working on the building, and personally gave him 
directions as to parts of the work, when she par-
ticipated in conversations between the contractors 
and her husband relative to the work while it was 
being done, or when she furnished what money 
was paid on some material and the building of 
the house. '' 
The ~lorrison, 1ferrill and Company v. Hardie L. 
Clark case is clearly distinguishable from the pres·ent 
case. The facts in the Clark case are: 
'''That J. W. Clark, defendant's husband, con-
tracted in writing for himself alone and on his 
own behalf to build the house on the lot in ques-
13 
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tion, which, in fact, belonged to his wife, and that 
he was not the agent of his wife. It further ap-
pears that defendant, Hardie L. Clark, knew that 
J. W. Clark had made the written contract, lived 
on the land and knew the work in constructing 
the hous·e was going on; that she did not prevent 
the erection of the building and never consented 
that her land should be liable on the contract for 
labor or material or otherwise. That she disagreed 
with her husband about constructing the house 
on this lot and wanted it erected on land in Cali-
fornia and objected and protested against the 
building of the house on her land and that he 
built the house against her objection and over 
her protest and she never consented thereto. Dur-
ing all this tilne and up to the completion of the 
house she believed, and he was, in fact, financially 
able to pay for the labor and materials so fur-
nished, he was not her agent in any such matter 
and had no right, title or interest in the land on 
which the house was constructed. The contract was 
not m·ade by her or on her behalf and she agreed 
to none of the terms, conditions or agreements 
thereof.'' 20 Utah Pages 439 & 440. 
In the Clark case the wife objected to what the hus-
band was doing with her property. In this case she did 
not object and acquiessed in his doing as he wanted with 
the property and, in fact, signed an agreement by which 
the property was to be re1nodeled during the same time 
that the last of the electrical work was being done. Mrs. 
Campbell had no interest in what was done with the 
property and the only reason it was in her name was 
because her husband had no credit rating. 
In the Clark case Mrs. Clark believed that her hus-
14 
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band \Yas and he \Yas, in fact, financially able to pay 
for the labor and 1naterials furnished \Yhile in this case 
j[r~. Campbell kne\v that her husband was financially 
e1nbarra~8ed and unable to pay for the work and nla-
terials furnished. 
In the Clark case there \\~as nothing from which an 
agency bet\Yeen husband and wife could he inferred while 
in this ease ~frs. Crunpbell permitted her husband to 
use and handle the property as his own, collect the rents, 
repair and ren1odel it and negotiate for the sale of the 
::;t~lne and the only thing that she did was to sign neces-
sary papers \vhen they were presented to her for signa-
ture and she even objected to having the prop·erty placed 
in her name. 
Under the facts and circumstances of the case Appel-
lant submits that ~Irs. Campbell should not now be per-
Initted to defeat the foreclosure of the lien against the 
property which she objected to owning and over which 
~he exercised no control but permitted her husband to 
exercise for her complete control and management. Mr. 
Ca1npbell died without any estate from which plaintiff 
111ight recover. Mrs. Campbell's property received the 
benefit of plaintiff's labor and materials. 
It is submitted that the clear weight of the evidence 
in this case is that agency existed between defendant and 
her husband and that the findings of the court that an 
agency did not exist is clearly against the weight of the 
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evidence and that the judgment appealed from should 
be revers~ed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELLIO,TT W. EV AN1S 
A ttarney fo:r AIP!p;ellarltt. 
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